07-29-2009, 11:24 AM
Everyone read this:
<!--quoteo-->QUOTE <!--quotec-->I happened to have heard two sets of commentators discussing the possiblity of the suicide squeeze the past two days. One was with runners on second and third in the top of the 8th and the other was with the bases loaded also in the top of the 8th. Both games were tied I think. I chuckled to myself, thinking, “Are all commentators idiots? Have they ever played the game before (isn’t that what they would ask the analysts?)? Does playing the game all your life even qualify you to make even relatively obvious decisions?” So why was I laughing?
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Let’s talk a little bit about the suicide in general. Of course it is a one run strategy, even more so than the sac bunt, although with only a runner on third it is not really a strict “one run strategy” as the batter can still get a single, error, or occasionally a safe on a fielder’s choice. So in general, you would tend to do it when exactly one run adds a lot to your WE. However, like the bunt, it is OK to do it early in a game when it raises your RE (if it EVER does, which I am not sure).
I won’t discuss why, but of course you would only do it with 1 out, never with 0 outs, although I did see a team try it with 0 outs one time (I think the manager was Frank Robinson and I seriously think he forgot how many outs there were). If you want to know why you don’t do it with 0 outs, play around a little with the RE tables.
Now, the question, and the reason why I chuckled, is, “Would you ever exercise a squeeze with anything but a single runner on third, unless the other runners didn’t count, like in a tie game in the bottom of the 9th or later?” The answer is no (although I suppose it is possible to occasionally be correct).
First of all, why is a squeeze rarely executed? There are basically 4 reasons. One, the batter has to be a very good bunter. Two, the pitcher has to mostly throw strikes. Three, if you do it too often, the defense can pitch out against you a lot (game theory). And four, and most important to this discussion, is that, like the sac bunt, at best, it is a marginal play. In other words, hitting away and executing the squeeze generally yields around the same WE, even in ideal circumstances. How do we know that? If it didn’t, then managers would be doing it A LOT more often than they do.
So given that (it is marginal, even in the best of circumstances), it is ONLY going to be correct in the bases configuration that yields the highest WE/RE when it is successful and hurts the least when it is unsuccessful. If we look at an RE table, we see that a successful squeeze raises the RE with a runner on 3rd by around .13 runs. Obviously it depends on the batter, following batter, run environment, etc. If you are unsuccessful (generally, the batter misses the ball or someone misses a sign), and the batter gets tagged out at home (on a missed bunt), it cost around .88 runs (the cost is the reason why it is rarely executed and is usually a marginal play at best).
Now, let’s assume that this is the baseline. In other words, this is the typical scenario such that it would only be correct to execute the suicide with different baserunner configurations if the benefit and cost were somewhere around the same (or perhaps better) as with the runner on third. Are they?
Well, with the bases loaded, even after a successful squeeze, you only pick up .03 runs (as opposed to hitting away)! Sure, that might be a little higher with a weak batter or one that grounds into a lot of DP, or the WE might be higher late in a close game. But still, it is a lot worse than with just a runner on third. What is the cost if the batter misses the ball or the sign? 1.1 runs! Surely it can’t be correct to suicide with the bases loaded!
How about with runners on second and third? Well, for one thing, we can say that with the bases loaded, you are almost guaranteed to stay out of the DP with the suicide. With runners on 2 and 3, you don’t have to worry about the GDP, so the suicide must be even less of an attractive option. Let’s see the gain and the benefit. The gain is.... Wait, after a successful squeeze, you actually lose around .02 in RE. Again that can vary and certainly the change in WE may be a little positive late in a close game. What about the loss when the runner gets tagged out at home on a missed bunt? 1.08 runs!
Moral of the story? Assuming that under the best of circumstances a suicide is occasionally a marginally correct play, which I think is a pretty good assumption, given only that it is one of the rarest elective plays in baseball, it is absolutely, unequivocably, NEVER correct to try a suicide with anything but a single runner on third base (with one out of course). So what were these genius commentators even thinking? BTW, not one of them mentioned or discussed the importance of the baserunner configuration.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--quoteo-->QUOTE <!--quotec-->I happened to have heard two sets of commentators discussing the possiblity of the suicide squeeze the past two days. One was with runners on second and third in the top of the 8th and the other was with the bases loaded also in the top of the 8th. Both games were tied I think. I chuckled to myself, thinking, “Are all commentators idiots? Have they ever played the game before (isn’t that what they would ask the analysts?)? Does playing the game all your life even qualify you to make even relatively obvious decisions?” So why was I laughing?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Let’s talk a little bit about the suicide in general. Of course it is a one run strategy, even more so than the sac bunt, although with only a runner on third it is not really a strict “one run strategy” as the batter can still get a single, error, or occasionally a safe on a fielder’s choice. So in general, you would tend to do it when exactly one run adds a lot to your WE. However, like the bunt, it is OK to do it early in a game when it raises your RE (if it EVER does, which I am not sure).
I won’t discuss why, but of course you would only do it with 1 out, never with 0 outs, although I did see a team try it with 0 outs one time (I think the manager was Frank Robinson and I seriously think he forgot how many outs there were). If you want to know why you don’t do it with 0 outs, play around a little with the RE tables.
Now, the question, and the reason why I chuckled, is, “Would you ever exercise a squeeze with anything but a single runner on third, unless the other runners didn’t count, like in a tie game in the bottom of the 9th or later?” The answer is no (although I suppose it is possible to occasionally be correct).
First of all, why is a squeeze rarely executed? There are basically 4 reasons. One, the batter has to be a very good bunter. Two, the pitcher has to mostly throw strikes. Three, if you do it too often, the defense can pitch out against you a lot (game theory). And four, and most important to this discussion, is that, like the sac bunt, at best, it is a marginal play. In other words, hitting away and executing the squeeze generally yields around the same WE, even in ideal circumstances. How do we know that? If it didn’t, then managers would be doing it A LOT more often than they do.
So given that (it is marginal, even in the best of circumstances), it is ONLY going to be correct in the bases configuration that yields the highest WE/RE when it is successful and hurts the least when it is unsuccessful. If we look at an RE table, we see that a successful squeeze raises the RE with a runner on 3rd by around .13 runs. Obviously it depends on the batter, following batter, run environment, etc. If you are unsuccessful (generally, the batter misses the ball or someone misses a sign), and the batter gets tagged out at home (on a missed bunt), it cost around .88 runs (the cost is the reason why it is rarely executed and is usually a marginal play at best).
Now, let’s assume that this is the baseline. In other words, this is the typical scenario such that it would only be correct to execute the suicide with different baserunner configurations if the benefit and cost were somewhere around the same (or perhaps better) as with the runner on third. Are they?
Well, with the bases loaded, even after a successful squeeze, you only pick up .03 runs (as opposed to hitting away)! Sure, that might be a little higher with a weak batter or one that grounds into a lot of DP, or the WE might be higher late in a close game. But still, it is a lot worse than with just a runner on third. What is the cost if the batter misses the ball or the sign? 1.1 runs! Surely it can’t be correct to suicide with the bases loaded!
How about with runners on second and third? Well, for one thing, we can say that with the bases loaded, you are almost guaranteed to stay out of the DP with the suicide. With runners on 2 and 3, you don’t have to worry about the GDP, so the suicide must be even less of an attractive option. Let’s see the gain and the benefit. The gain is.... Wait, after a successful squeeze, you actually lose around .02 in RE. Again that can vary and certainly the change in WE may be a little positive late in a close game. What about the loss when the runner gets tagged out at home on a missed bunt? 1.08 runs!
Moral of the story? Assuming that under the best of circumstances a suicide is occasionally a marginally correct play, which I think is a pretty good assumption, given only that it is one of the rarest elective plays in baseball, it is absolutely, unequivocably, NEVER correct to try a suicide with anything but a single runner on third base (with one out of course). So what were these genius commentators even thinking? BTW, not one of them mentioned or discussed the importance of the baserunner configuration.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->